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C
hina’s annual trade balance has risen from a small
deficit (–$1.9 billion) in 1980 to a $400 billion
surplus in 2009. The bulk of the surplus results
from trade with the United States. During the same period,
China’s total foreign reserves (mostly U.S. dollars) increased
from $2.5 billion to around $2.4 trillion. Trade would be
more balanced if the Chinese bought more American goods.
But why aren’t they doing so?
Many people believe that the steady increase in America’s
trade deficit with China has occurred because Chinese
currency is significantly undervalued. Namely, Chinese
goods are too cheap relative to American goods. Hence,
Americans can buy many Chinese goods while the Chinese
cannot afford American goods. Indeed, many U.S. politicians
have alleged that the Chinese government has manipulated
its currency deliberately to achieve a trade surplus and
excessive foreign reserves.1
Why would the Chinese government do that? One
popular argument is that an undervalued home currency
promotes employment. However, selling goods at signifi-
cantly low prices to the United States and holding American
dollars as a store of value is equivalent to lending goods to
the United States in return for IOUs that pay little or neg-
ative interest (due to inflation). Chinese workers would be
better off spending their dollars instead of saving them.
Why would the Chinese tighten their belts so much and
lend to American consumers when they are still struggling
with very low per capita incomes themselves?
The standard economic theory of precautionary saving
provides one plausible explanation: Even though China
has had 30 years of impressive economic growth since its
economic reform and globalization, its financial sector
reform has not caught up with its economic growth. The
lack of social safety nets and the country’s severely under-
developed insurance and financial markets have forced
the Chinese to save excessively as insurance against idio-
syncratic uncertainty, such as income shocks, unemploy-
ment, accidents, and other unexpected spending needs.2
In fact, during the 30 years of rapid economic growth,
China’s private consumption-to-national income ratio (C/Y)
has fallen from roughly 50 percent to 35 percent while the
share of government spending (G/Y) has remained roughly
constant at about 14 percent (see chart). Hence, Chinese
consumers have significantly reduced their propensity to
consume despite rapidly rising incomes. As a result, China’s
national saving rate (investment plus net exports) ([I+NX]/Y)
has increased steadily despite low interest rates.
Chinese workers cannot invest their savings of foreign
currencies directly in foreign assets because China has
capital controls. The government meets the savings demands
of its domestic residents by selling them Chinese govern-
ment bonds and using the proceeds to purchase foreign
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Consumption and Saving Trend(especially U.S.) bonds.3 In some sense, the Chinese govern-
ment is functioning like a bank, enabling savers to invest.
So the effective owner of the foreign reserves in China is
not the government but the private sector.
The important point is that both the Chinese trade
surplus with the United States and the amassed foreign
reserves result from the savings decisions of Chinese con-
sumers. If consumers want to spend more on American
goods, they can sell their government bonds and thus
siphon some U.S. dollars from the Chinese government’s
foreign reserves.
This analysis suggests that lack of financial development
in China—not the fixed exchange rate—has created the
huge trade imbalance between China and the rest of the
world. Hence, only financial development within China
will ultimately resolve it. ■
1 For example, a bipartisan group of 14 U.S. senators announced new legislation
in March 2010 to crack down on unfair currency manipulation by China (see
http://schumer.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=323135&).
2 Theory predicts that when people face large uninsured risks and are subject to
borrowing constraints, not only do they save excessively but their marginal propen-
sity to save increases with income growth despite low deposit rates. See Wen, Yi.
“Saving and Growth under Borrowing Constraints: Explaining the ‘High Saving
Rate’ Puzzle.” Working Paper No. 2009-045B, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
revised October 2009; http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2009/2009-045.pdf.
3 Ironically, if Chinese savers were free to put their money anywhere in the world,
there could be a large outflow of renminbi into other currencies and a resulting
depreciation rather than appreciation.
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